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SAUDI ARABIA: EDUCATION AS A
TOOL FOR DEVELOPMENT

May 1975

This study has been undertaken in connection with a multi-country program of assessing social change in the Arab world. It is being sent to analysts and others who have a particular interest in the affairs of Saudi Arabia and the Peninsula. After surveying the Saudi transition from the traditional to a contemporary form of education, paying particular attention to the continuing influence of religion, the paper assesses the degree to which Saudi educational programs will fall short of meeting the country's requirement for trained manpower in the years ahead and describes the options open to the Kingdom to cope with the problem. These topics are covered in Sections V and VI.

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SAUDI ARABIA: EDUCATION AS A
TOOL FOR DEVELOPMENT

I. THE SETTING

Until the end of the second World War, the inhospitable and barren desert of the Arabian peninsula had provided the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a cultural cocoon. While its more accessible neighbors were experiencing foreign invasion and rule, society in Saudi Arabia continued to follow, as it had for centuries, a political system modeled after that developed by the prophet Mohammed. The holy book of Islam, the Koran, served as constitution, legal code, and social guide; and the traditional Arab values and customs dictated daily life. The primitive economic structure was based on oasis agriculture, nomadic herding, commerce, and the pilgrimage revenues. Only 30 years ago, the Kingdom was bankrupt more often than not, facing crisis after crisis in the process of becoming a united state. Almost overnight, all this changed. Following the discovery of vast Saudi oil reserves in 1938, oil revenues grew from \$100,000 in that year to \$5.5 billion in 1973. Saudi Arabia's estimated 1974 revenues are \$30 billion.

Yet, in 1975 and the years to come, Saudi Arabia will be facing a crisis just as real as any of those of the past. Her future financial security, due to the depletable nature of oil, requires economic diversification. While the nation presently can afford to import the material resources and manpower necessary to build an adequate production base and diversify the economy, the population of Saudi Arabia lacks the orientation and skills to fully participate in such a structure.

If the government cannot develop the Saudi's potential through educational programs and manpower planning, foreign workers will be employed at increasing rates, and, "the Kingdom will find that Saudis are becoming second class citizens in their own land." (Guidelines for the Second Development Plan 1975-1980, Saudi Arabian Central Planning Organization, p. 184.) Perhaps even worse, the very vision of a modern Islamic state, so long protected and nurtured within the cocoon of cultural homogeneity and religious puritanism, may well be destroyed in the wake of wholesale modernization.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION

A. Background

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[REDACTED] Before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938, the nation's social and economic environment provided neither the motivation nor the funds to expand the centuries-old, Islamic concept of education. Education, when available, remained largely limited to religious teaching and focused on the study of the Koran.

Because the Koran is a religious book, revealed to Mohammed the prophet, it is sacred and must remain unaltered. Its sacred nature leaves little room for personal interpretation or free thinking concerning its content. In the kuttab, Koranic school, a young boy would spend the entire day listening to, memorizing, and reciting the Koran

and traditions of Islam. He then advanced to learning other religious texts and his instructor's detailed interpretation of them. Thus, formal education entailed learning by rote, memorization of verbal content, and afforded little or no interpretation of substance. Only a few developed reading and writing skills beyond the rudimentary level.

While classes in the kuttab were theoretically open to girls, in practice, very few were educated. Restricted by the religious values and social norms of Saudi culture, women had few activities outside the home. In this role, they had little opportunity or motivation to seek learning, and essentially no way to use it.

Tutorial education was the counterpart of the kuttab for the sons of the royal family and the elite. While the strong religious orientation remained, studies also included literary disciplines and minimal instruction in secular subjects. The approach and purpose of education was the same as that of the kuttab. For example, the late King Faysal received no formal education, "but was brought up under the direct influence and guidance of my father, and I have tried to follow in his footsteps." From his maternal grandfather, a man known for his piety and learning, he learned to recite the Koran before he could read. He also studied the Prophet's Traditions, read Arabic literature and composed poetry.

All forms of formal education, private or public, were restricted to only a small percentage of the population. The only really widespread

form of education was the informal teaching provided within the family. Children were reared within the social and religious structure prescribed by Islam, listened to Arab folklore and poetry, and were taught the customs and social practices of their culture. Thus, even the unschooled nomad could recite folk poetry, cite Arab history, and repeat parts of the Holy Koran.

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In short, all forms of traditional education in Saudi Arabia served one purpose: instill the new generations with the religious and social values and traditions of their forefathers. This form of education was at one time common to the Arab world. The uniqueness of Saudi Arabia lies in the fact that this system existed, uninfluenced by foreign colonization, missionary activities, or secularization, until the mid-20th century. While the rest of the Middle East was discovering the West and experiencing subsequent change, Saudi Arabia was rediscovering Islam in its most fundamental and puritanical form,

Wahhabism

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**Wahhabism, a sect of Islam founded in the 18th century by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, advocates a return to the simplicity of the early religion as recorded in the Koran and sunna (tradition based on the words or deeds of the Prophet Mohammed.) This movement won the support of the Saudi family in the 1750's, and, since that time, the House of Saud has been synonymous with the Wahhabi movement.*

Present-day Saudi Arabia was established through the military-religious exploits of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud in the first quarter of this century. Patterned after the Moslem community of the Koran, religious authority existed in parallel with the secular authority. Ibn Saud was the ruler under God while the ulema (the learned men) were the guardians of the people's conscience. The Koran was the only constitution and Wahhabi interpretation of the holy text and the sunna were observed to the letter.

And so Saudi Arabia might have remained, but for its increasing financial requirements. As a traditional tribal shaykh, ibn Saud was responsible for the welfare of his people. Their continued allegiance rested on his ability to provide. With few exports, a heavy need for imports, and no steady source of revenue, a concession agreement with ARAMCO seemed a handy means of obtaining the necessary cash to stabilize the newly conquered state. | The social impact of this action was never anticipated -- nor was it sought -- either by the Saudis or the Americans:

"...segregation was easy to achieve: the desert was empty enough and big enough for the Americans to disappear in it. This was what they wanted; they were there to find oil, and for no other reason, and the Arabs could not help them. It was also what ibn Saud wanted; he had admitted the Americans to his country, but he still hoped to avoid exposing his people to their influence."
(David Howarth, The Desert King, a Life of ibn Saud, Collins Clear-Type Press, London, 1964, p. 191)

Once oil was discovered, however, and production begun on a large scale, interface between the Americans and Arabs was inevitable. Faced with Saudi Arabia's primitive economic structure, non-existent infrastructure, and unskilled and uneducated populace, ARAMCO imported everything the complex oil industry required, while working to develop an indigenous supply wherever possible. In the fields of education and manpower development, ARAMCO began by giving employees in the Eastern Province on-the-job training. Through example and repetition, those never exposed

to the industry and lacking any formal education could become accomplished in a complex skill. Formal training was necessary to further "Saudi-ize" the work force and place Saudis in managerial positions. Industrial Training Centers were established in Abqaiq, Dhahran, and Ras Tanura, offering classes in Arabic, English, mathematics, the sciences, social studies and the operation of business machines. Today, courses are available during regular working hours and on the employees' own time. Craftshop classrooms provide instruction in electronics, instrument repair, refrigeration mechanics, and machinery and air-conditioning maintenance. Courses, academic standards, and the teacher complement all have evolved with the changing operating environment and the increasing level of skills available in the labor force.

For its part, Saudi society, exposed for the first time to modern technology, foreigners and foreign ways, regular work opportunities and a stimulated economy, was stunned. The new oil wealth made public education feasible and the administrative and technical needs for both ARAMCO and the government made it necessary.* However, educational development was deterred by the cultural forces of traditional Saudi society.

* In 1926, the government had ruled to establish public education as is evidenced by articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Hijaz:
article 23: Public education comprises the diffusion of science, education, and the arts, and the opening of libraries, schools, and religious institutes, great care and attention being taken to act in accordance with the foundations of the religion...
article 24: A law for public education shall be decreed and shall be brought into force gradually. Elementary education shall be free of cost throughout the Kingdom of the Hijaz.
This document ultimately influenced educational legislation for the entire Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its implementation, however, came only with the changing financial and political conditions.

B. Government and Education

Given the political and religious importance of the Saud family, the ruler has had a primary role in determining the pace of change. Ibn Saud united the country and contributed to the physical internal stability, but the value of spreading the benefits of progress through social reform rather than gold was unfathomable to him. His son and successor, Saud, was so pre-occupied with international affairs and so extravagant in the spending of public monies that he brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy and political upheaval. It remained to the late King Faysal to implement a course of social reform and measured domestic growth with the ultimate goal of "developing the community educationally, culturally, and socially so that it might reach the level that would be truly represented in the form of a unified system of government calculated to achieve the ideals embodied in the sacred law..."*

In his self-appointed task of forming and implementing a relatively moderate social policy which will insure progress, stability, and relative prosperity, Faysal tried to take up every matter himself and make the final decision. The procedure was slow and tedious, but served to monitor the pace and direction of social change.

* Majid Khadduri, Arab Contemporaries, the Role of Personalities in Politics, p. 98.

Consequently, education in Saudi Arabia is determinedly paternalistic at all levels. The government strictly controls both the policy formation and administration of the system, largely through the Ministry of Education, established in 1954, and the Office of the Grand Mufti. In theory, the Ministry of Education is responsible for male elementary and higher level secular education and institutes of higher learning, while the Office of the Grand Mufti administers girls' education. However, due to the separation of secular and religious instruction after the elementary level, the Office of the Grand Mufti is also responsible for intermediate and secondary religious schools and religious colleges.

In the Ministry of Education, the chief executive officer is, of course, the Minister of Education. Directly under him are the Deputy Minister of Educational Affairs, and the Director General of Education. The nation is divided into twenty-three educational districts, located throughout the Kingdom as follows:

Western:	11
Central:	10
Eastern:	2

The director of each serves in liaison between the local schools and the Deputy Minister of Educational Affairs and the Director General of Education. In addition, there are eleven Directorates General within the ministry, the heads of each reporting to one of the Deputy Ministers. Overall administration is the responsibility of the Deputy Minister of Educational Affairs.

Other ministries are also involved in some aspects of education. For example, the Ministries of Finance and National Economy

and of Pilgrimage and Religious Endowments are involved in educational finance and land acquisition for schools; the Ministry of Defense and Aviation conducts literacy programs; the College of Petroleum and Minerals is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth, while the Ministry of Labor is responsible for several vocational schools. These different institutes, however, do not operate entirely independent of Ministry of Education and Office of the Grand Mufti interest.

There are numerous interministerial bodies which coordinate different aspects of educational administration throughout the Kingdom. One such body is the Supreme Council of Education, chaired by the Minister of Education and composed of the Grand Mufti and other cabinet members. This council coordinates educational proposals, formulates policy, and supervises the educational budget. A second council, the Supreme Council for the Promotion of Arts, Sciences, and Fine Arts selects and writes textbooks and translates additional educational materials. There are also a number of advisory bodies associated with the Ministry of Education, such as the National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Boy Scouts Association. All are headed by the Minister of Education and have officials of other ministries as members.

In forming educational policy, the government's rigid centralization of authority requires high-level concurrence on even seemingly minor decisions, innovations, and deviation from set policy. All formal legislation bearing on educational policy or planning must first be submitted to the Council of Ministers by one of the ministries involved in education or by one of the interministerial bodies. The proposal is then examined by the Council, submitted to the King, and then issued by him in the form of a royal order or decree. "Revolutions can come from thrones as well as from conspirators' cellars." (King Faysal ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, Time Magazine, 6 January 1975)

The government bureaucracy usually delays, hinders, and often outright forgets about execution of educational policy. In requiring high-level concurrence for even minor decisions, the local administrator who is in the best position to judge particular needs is the farthest from the seat of decision-making. A side effect of this practice is the lack of career development of middle and lower level administrative personnel. For the most part, they are discouraged from suggesting innovation, and, as they themselves are never involved in the decision-making process, do not develop the ability to make decisions or accept responsibility. Those few qualified forward looking educators are held in check by their traditionally oriented superiors. In addition, the Ministry of Education has not

enjoyed the luxury of filling positions with qualified individuals. Those qualified Saudis who seek government employment experience fierce interministerial competition for their talents. The Ministry of Education, far from the most prestigious in the country, usually loses. In a 1972 evaluation of the educational backgrounds and job qualification of its employees, the Ministry discovered that, aside from a few top level administrators with university educations, most employees in administrative and clerical positions had only an elementary education.

Saudi educators, products of this isolated educational system, teach as they were taught. New modern teaching techniques and high quality classroom materials appear slowly. Learning by rote continues, re-enforced by the practice of administering a single end-of-year exam. Success on these tests depends on sheer memorization of class texts and whatever lecture notes the students have amassed. The consequences of this orientation to learning are visible in the Saudi's approach to more advanced studies. In institutes of higher learning within the Kingdom, libraries are seldom used, independent research by either faculty or students is the exception, and the student attitude toward learning is generally regarded as poor. The abilities to analyze, synthesize, and innovate, stressed in Western society, are not developed.

The Saudis have experimented with the hiring of non-Saudi, Arab and non-Arab, teachers, but this is far from a complete solution to the problem. While they are generally better qualified than their Saudi counterparts, the cultural and psychological problems facing them in Saudi Arabia limit their teaching performance. With no orientation, they are thrust into the classroom. There, as well as in the community, their presence is regarded as a necessary evil. They are accorded little status and receive less respect. Few renew their initial contracts. Strict government controls make the employment of competent foreigners even more difficult. Anyone suspected of political views contrary to those advocated in Saudi Arabia, or coming from a country which does not currently enjoy good relations with Saudi Arabia, is not granted entrance. Once admitted, deportation is always a possibility. The fluctuating number of Egyptian educators over the past years exemplifies this practice.*

Similar fear of foreign political influence affects government policy on study abroad. Those Saudis who obtain scholarships for

* *The Saudi educational system traditionally had relied on Egyptian teachers and texts. However, in the 1950's with Nasir's rise to power in Egypt and subsequent Egyptian-Saudi hostilities, the number of Egyptian educators in Saudi Arabia dwindled. In 1970 relations between Riyadh and Cairo began to improve, and by 1971, the Saudi government was again actively seeking 3,000 Egyptian teachers. The same pattern can be seen in the case of the Palestinians employed.*

advanced study outside the Kingdom must keep in close contact with embassy officials to retain their stipends. In addition, they are required to return each summer to Saudi Arabia for "re-Saudization." Every precaution is taken to assure that they progress in their field of academic pursuit without developing alien political philosophies.

C. Religion and Education

The secular authority, however, is not completely free in decision-making and policy implementation. No ruler in a land where Islamic law reigns supreme can ignore the counsel of the religious doctors, the ulema. To do so risks domestic political instability. As guardians of the traditional practices, the ulema remain safely entrenched in the Saudi government and the traditional culture. Through the regular Friday sermons which are still well attended, they rail against foreign influences. Through the mutawi'in, the religious police, they seek to enforce strict conformity to traditional behavior. As they generally reject all but the slightest indication of modernity, secular policy makers are required to slowly and patiently make understood the need for any specific innovation.

The ulema's voice in education is heard not only through the Office of the Grand Mufti, but also in the Ministry of Education itself, the Minister of which is traditionally of the al-Shaykh family, descendants of Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi sect of Islam. Consequently, the conservative religious influence is felt throughout the secular educational system as well as in the specifically religious institutes, as the standard curricula for government primary and intermediate schools in the table shows.

CURRICULA FOR PRIMARY AND INTERMEDIATE SCHOOLS, SAUDI ARABIA
(Periods per week)

SUBJECT	PRIMARY						INTERMEDIATE		
	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	4th year	5th year	6th year	1st year	2nd year	3rd year
Arabic	5	7	10	10	10	10	7	7	6
Drawing and handwork	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
English language	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	8
General science and hygiene	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3
Geography and history	0	0	0	1	3	3	1	4	4
Mathematics	5	5	6	5	5	5	4	4	5
Physical training	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Religion (Islamic)	14	16	12	12	9	9	9	8	8
Total	30	34	34	34	34	34	36	36	36

The religious influence reaches beyond the curricula, however. It dominates the entire focus of education. In Saudi Arabia, the expressed objective of education is a reconciliation between old and modern trends in education, all in accordance with the Shari'a (Islamic law) instruction; maintenance of the customs and traditions of the country, preserving the social inheritance and adopting only those practices which have been proven reliable and of a "pure" source; and teaching cohesion of God's community -- "a believer is the support of another believer, like a building where each part supports the other part." ("Broad Lines of Social Training in Schools of the Eastern Province," H.E. Shaykh Abdullah Mohammed Abu-Nuhayn, Director of Education for the Eastern Province, January 18, 1972.)

Thus, books, publications, and films entering the country are heavily restricted. Imported texts are carefully scrutinized to prevent exposure to practices and values contrary to austere Wahhabi norms of conduct. Anything reflecting dating and courtship practices or social relations between the sexes is forbidden. Consequently, many texts for specific courses are printed domestically.

In even the most modern secular institute in the country, the College of Petroleum and Minerals, the administration admits a "psychological fear" of the power of the ulema. After determining that professional engineering societies in the United States recommend that at least 25 percent of the engineering student's time should be devoted to the liberal arts, the college continues to carefully avoid the teaching of history and political science courses recommended STAT

Exposure to foreigners is also restricted. While the shortage of qualified instructors has forced the school system to rely heavily on foreigners, their social influence is contained as much as possible. Outside the classroom, faculty-student relations, even tutoring, are curtailed. At the University of Riyadh, for example, foreign faculty and their families are provided separate and distant sport facilities. Administrators fear that any association would only expose students to morally debauching influences.

The Office of the Grand Mufti has direct control over religious schools in each of the 23 educational districts, administered by the Directorate General of Religious Colleges and Institutes, and over female education, administered by the Directorate General of Girls' Schools. While there is an effort to standardize requirements in lower level secular institutes and the lower level religious and girls' schools, the Office of the Grand Mufti sets its own standards independent of the Ministry of Education for those institutes under its jurisdiction.

The girls' educational system exists today only through a government-ulema agreement in 1960: the ulema would permit the education of women if, and only if, that system were under the control of the religious leaders. Consequently, girls' education today is generally far inferior to that of males. The course of study contains a maximum of home economics, Arabic, and religion, and a minimum of everything else. Post-elementary students are pushed into teacher training or nursing institutes.

The segregation of men and women, present in traditional Arab society and strengthened by the strong traditional influence of the Wahhabis, makes for a difficult chain of communication between girls' schools and the administration. For example, most high-level administrative positions within the Directorate are filled by men. Yet, these very men that administer girls' schools normally are not allowed to enter them. If a male administrator needs to contact a female teacher, he must go through the Education Inspectorate in the Ministry of Education. The Inspectorate, where there are women, passes his message on. In conducting an inspection or courtesy visit, a male supervisor usually is guided around a vacant building by the headmistress' husband. And, since Saudi women are not permitted to drive, the school buses that transport girls have to be manned by a husband-wife team. Higher education for women, approved by the government in 1964, also maintains the strict segregation of the sexes. Women audit lectures through closed circuit T.V. and have access to library facilities only on days reserved for their private use.

III. DESCRIPTION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM

Understandably, educational development in Saudi Arabia has moved only slowly toward the goal of universal literacy and growth of a trained and competent labor force. The government, although striving toward modernization, fears political disruption, whether instigated by foreign political philosophies, ulema resistance to any change that will undermine religious puritanism, or alienation of the traditional Saudi's support. Faysal's moderation has been criticized by both the extreme traditionalists and the radical modernists. The first have denounced him as easy with the licentious, and the second as too slow in carrying out reform. Nonetheless, a public educational system exists today where it did not twenty years ago. A general description of the schools and institutes follows.

A. Elementary, Intermediate and Secondary Levels

In Saudi Arabia, a child begins kindergarten at the age of four or five. At age six, he enters the elementary stage. While history, geography, mathematics, and possibly English are introduced the curriculum is largely religiously oriented and stresses classical Arabic and Islamic studies. Upon completion of the elementary cycle, at age twelve or thirteen, students are administered uniform examinations by the Ministry of Education, and if successful, are awarded an elementary certificate.

At that time, a student may continue in the "modern" secular schools, or elect to attend an Islamic school, administered by the Office of the Grand Mufti. This secondary cycle of instruction is divided into an intermediate and secondary level, each taking three years to complete.

Acceptance into a secular intermediate school is determined by results of competitive examination, and is thus accessible to only the better qualified students. While religious training and classical Arabic continue to be stressed, basic courses in science, history, literature and mathematics are also offered. An intermediate school diploma and a scholastic average of over seventy percent qualify a student for enrollment in a secondary school.

Serving as a preparation for college, the secondary school offers specialization in arts or sciences. The art program requires courses in two foreign languages (usually English and French), history, literature, Arabic, geography, and Islam and Islamic jurisprudence. The science program concentrates on English, physics, chemistry, and biology, with additional courses in religion and history. A general secondary certificate of education requires successful completion of all courses with passing grades of fifty percent.

In contrast to the "modern" path, the religious educational curriculum is designed for those aspiring to become ulema or qadis (judges): At the intermediate level, the Shari'a, Islamic culture, religion, and social studies are taught. Classical Arabic grammar and rhetoric, the Shari'a, customary law, and theology are emphasized in the secondary cycle.

B. Institutes of Higher Learning

Institutes of higher learning are also of two types: traditional and religiously oriented, or secular. Admission to either sort requires

a secondary diploma and passing a competitive examination. Even with a relatively small population and a very late start in the field, Saudi Arabia today accounts for 2.1 percent of all higher education enrollment in the Middle East and is expanding enrollment at the fastest rate in the area (M. Ali Kettani, "Engineering Education in the Arab World", Middle East Journal, vol. 28 no. 4, Autumn 1974, p. 446.) The table following shows the number of college graduates, 1967-1971.

The University of Riyadh, founded in 1957, is the first "Western" type secular institute established by the Saudi Arabian government. Beginning as a College of Arts and Sciences with nine teachers and 21 students, the University has expanded to include faculties of commerce, engineering, education, agriculture, pharmacy, and medicine. There currently are 300 teachers and almost 6,000 students, the vast majority of whom are Saudi.

King Abd Al-Aziz University of Jidda was originally founded by Saudi businessmen and philanthropists as a private business college. It then grew to include a College of Liberal Arts and a College of Science. Continuing financial difficulties forced the university to become a public institution in the spring of 1971. At that time, it was administratively united with the Shari'a College and the College of Education in Mecca. The name, King Abd Al-Aziz, was retained for all three institutes. In 1971-72, there were 425 students enrolled in the Shari'a College, 540 in the College of Education, and 491 at the university's Jidda campus.

Graduates of Institutes of Higher Education (1966/67 - 1971/72)*

	1966/67			1967/68			1968/69			1969/70			1970/71			1971/72		
	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total	females	males	total
TOTAL	7	380	387	5	523	528	10	624	634	13	795	808	27	806	833	39	106	145
Secular:																		
University of Riyadh																		
Arts	7	52	59	3	52	55	7	59	66	12	103	115	16	104	120	16	127	143
Commerce	-	46	46	2	49	51	2	49	51	1	61	62	2	77	79	2	109	111
Science	-	20	20	-	27	27	-	26	26	-	27	27	-	60	60	-	73	73
Pharmacy	-	11	11	-	-	-	-	4	4	-	10	10	-	15	15	-	18	18
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	-	22	22	-	16	16	-	14	14
Education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	-	25	25	-	44	44
Engineering	-	16	16	-	28	28	-	26	26	-	25	25	-	34	34	-	36	36
Medicine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
King Abd al-Aziz																		
Economics & Admin.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	30	37
Arts	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	64
Shari'a (Mecca)	-	7	7	-	33	33	-	46	46	-	54	54	-	55	55	-	64	64
Education (Mecca)	-	15	15	-	23	23	-	23	23	-	43	43	9	52	61	13	64	77
Science	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
College of Petroleum and Minerals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	46
College of Education for Girls	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religious:																		
Shari'a (Riyadh)	-	105	105	1	133	134	1	142	143	-	165	165	-	133	133	1	238	239
Arabic Language (Riyadh)	-	69	69	-	69	69	-	109	109	-	136	136	-	88	88	-	104	104
Islamic University (Medina)																		
Shari'a	-	39	39	-	108	108	-	108	108	-	97	97	-	86	86	-	70	70
Preaching	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	37	-	49	49	-	53	53
Higher Institute of Jurisprudence	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	-	16	16

The College of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran was established by royal decree in 1963 and opened in 1964. Administratively under the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth, the college's board of trustees is chaired by the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth. The college is financed by the Saudi government, major oil companies and foundation grants.

The college is unique in many respects. It offers a five-year course of study which leads to a Bachelor of Science in Applied Engineering or Engineering Science. Its goal is to maintain the standards of an American school of technology: admission standards are high, courses difficult, and the faculty largely made up of American and English professors. All courses, except those dealing with Arabic and related studies, are taught in English.

The first year program is largely a preparatory one, aimed at improving the student's mastery of English. After this first year, students are either placed in engineering science or applied engineering, or dismissed. In 1972, there were 922 students, 350 of whom were newly admitted "pre-freshmen."

The college has been criticized by the Ministry of Education for supplying too theoretically oriented an education and encouraging students to seek advanced degrees. Consequently, while standards have not been changed to accommodate the Ministry, the college is extremely selective in extending the scope of courses offered. The performances of students transferred to American institutes to complete their

undergraduate schooling or pursue graduate studies has proved that the objective of supplying Western technological training in Saudi Arabia is being met.

Religious Institutes

Religious institutes of higher learning are under the authority of the Grand Mufti. Like the lower Islamic schools, the curriculum emphasizes the study of Arabic, the Koran, Islamic law and jurisprudence. The schools are supported by government funds and religious endowments. There are four such universities.

The Islamic University (Medina), opened in 1961, operates two divisions of higher education: the Shari'a College which offers a four-year program culminating in a degree in Islamic Law, and a College of Islamic Preaching (Da'wa). In addition, the university offers programs below the level of higher education: an intermediate section for students of other countries who need preparatory courses in Arabic and Islamic studies, a secondary section for students who have only an intermediate level education, and a "House of Tradition" which provides instruction in Islamic studies and traditions for students of all ages. Modeled after al-Azhar, the university encourages students from all other Muslim countries to enroll. In 1972, there were 568 students at all levels and 29 instructors.

The Shari'a College and Arabic Language College of Riyadh, opened in 1953 and 1954 respectively, accept only secondary certificate holders for their three year programs. Courses emphasize Islamic law and theology and classical Arabic.

Established in 1966, the Higher Institute of Jurisprudence in Riyadh is open to graduates of Shari'a colleges. The curriculum includes advanced studies in jurisprudence, Islamic texts, and comparative law. The studies program runs three years. Graduates receive a doctorate in Muslim law and are qualified as qadis (judges) for the Kingdom's Shari'a courts.

C. Special Education

Adult education was initiated in 1954. Basic courses were offered to non-literate adults in night sessions conducted at select elementary schools throughout the Kingdom. The program was initially limited to the large population areas. With the rapid expansion of elementary school construction after 1965, however, the program now operates in all twenty-three school districts. The originally informal and unstructured program has developed into a two-part, four-year course. The first two-year basic phase stresses reading and writing skills. The second two-year phase provides a basic elementary education. Successful students earn a standard elementary diploma. In 1973/74, there were 814 locations offering 2,252 classes to 53,923 students.

Vocational training programs have been developed in several different fields by a number of ministries. For example, with the supervisory assistance of the International Labor Organization, the Ministry of Labor opened a Vocational Training Center in Riyadh in 1964. Additional trade schools were then established in Jidda (1966), Dammam (1966), Buraidah (1968) and al-Jawf (1969). All offer training in such trades as plumbing, printing, electrical wiring, carpentry, general mechanics, and radio and television work. The average course lasts eighteen months. Students must be at least eighteen years old and have only an elementary level education. While the first graduates experienced some difficulties in being placed, the reputation of the centers and the competence of their graduates has grown. All of the more recent graduates have been placed before graduation.

There are more advanced training institutes in Riyadh, Hofuf, Jidda, Riyadh and Medina under the administration of the Ministry of Education. Admittance requires an intermediate school certificate. The curriculum at these centers is about thirty percent academic and seventy percent vocational. Courses are taught in metalwork, electricity, automobile repair and radio/TV. Graduates of the three-year program serve as technicians for science and industry, rather than as basic craftsmen. They are also qualified to teach at the Ministry of Labor's vocational training centers.

The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education jointly control agricultural training facilities. Initially, the program was taught at an intermediate level in thirty-four schools dispersed throughout the agricultural regions. This program was modified in 1965, when the schools were closed and their function replaced by the services of countryside extension offices. Centers of Complementary Studies in Riyadh and Ta'if now offer a secondary level education in agricultural studies. Graduates are employed by the Ministry of Agriculture, given additional, more practical training, and then sent out to man the extension offices.

The Institute of Public Administration was established in Riyadh in 1962. Although it is usually considered an institute of higher learning, it offers no degrees and conducts only short courses. As the institute's purpose is to supply administrative and clerical personnel for the Saudi civil service, its courses are in such areas

as financial affairs, secretarial and office services, statistics, program planning and development, library skills, and English. A small number of the institute's students have been sent to the United States to obtain master's degrees in public administration, library science, or economics. In response to its own needs, the Municipalities Department of the Ministry of Interior founded the Training Center for Technical Assistants. There, instruction is offered in architectural drawing, supervision, and surveying.

Teaching Training

In response to the great shortage of Saudi teachers, the educational system has established elementary teacher training institutes throughout the country. These are schools in the secondary cycle, and therefore require an intermediate certificate for admittance. In addition, there are two "teacher upgrading centers." These centers raise teachers who are graduates from the elementary teacher training institutes of the past or are graduates of the intermediate schools to the level of graduates of the new elementary teacher training institutes. Intermediate and secondary teachers are educated at the university level. In 1973, there were fifteen such institutes in fifteen separate school districts.

Special education is also available to the handicapped. Instruction for the blind is available through the secondary level in Riyadh, through the intermediate level in Hofuf, Mecca, and Unaizah, and through the elementary level in Qateef and Buraidah. The Institute for the Blind

for girls in Riyadh offers elementary and intermediate education. Books for the blind are printed and published in Riyadh. There are at present two institutes for deaf-mutes, one for males and the other for females. Students are admitted at an early age to a preparatory stage after which they follow a slightly modified elementary program.

IV. MODERN EDUCATION AND THE TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

The educational system, although mediocre at best, is expanding at all levels at a rate unmatched in the Middle East. This is reflected in the growing number of educated Saudis. One may question if the present political system, religious order, and traditional values can endure secular education and awareness of non-Saudi values and lifestyles.

Essentially, the answer is yes. Education is serving to begin the integration of isolated segments of the traditionally-oriented population into the national society. For example, government stipends to students in adult education courses was, in many cases, the first time that money, or any concept of money as a means of exchange, was introduced to the small villages. Awareness of the central government, increasingly widespread educational opportunities, and subsequent social mobility has begun to erase the provincialism that has been an obstacle to national cohesion.* Thus, the sons of Bedouins can now receive an education, be it technical or academic, and move to find employment elsewhere, geographically and socially.

Even institutes of higher learning, approaching a technical proficiency equal to their Western counterparts, do not awaken discontent and frustration. "This is in sharp contrast to other

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universities in the Arab world. In Lebanon, students at both the National University and the American University are more frequently on strike than they are in class, and are showing an increasing inclination to take to the streets on behalf of various political causes. In Syria, the ruling Baath party calls upon students to demonstrate in support of any issue which it feels needs a good show of public enthusiasm, while in Egypt students have assumed the self-appointed role of watchdog, emitting occasional growls whenever they believe the nation's only recognized political party is behaving in ways contrary to the public interest." (John Monroe, "On Campus in Saudi Arabia" ARAMCO World Magazine July-August 1974 p. 9) Even the growing corps of highly educated people in Saudi Arabia, many returning from advanced study programs abroad, express little real discontent with the present order.

This lack of discontent can be attributed to several factors. First, traditional Moslem society of the Saudi pattern is egalitarian, characterized by a lack of real class discrimination. While it is accepted that inequalities of talent and wealth rightly exist as ordained by God, there is no socially exclusive nobility or aristocracy. In addition, the more fortunate have a responsibility to the greater community. This continuing concept has provided an educational system, a means of spreading the opportunities for economic advancement and social mobility, which is open to all.

Second, most Saudis are satisfied with the growing availability of consumer goods and the signs of material prosperity which are appearing. Economic opportunities are so available that there is little possibility of personal frustration. While the present regime is not likely to permit expressed opposition to its authority, there exists no great public demand for its removal or for broadened political participation. As long as economic development, the gradual secularization of society, and social progress continue, little opposition seems likely.

Third, the Saudi, even after foreign education, is by nature atypically conservative. Although economic modernization without major political change seems unlikely to many Western minds, it is the goal to a greater or lesser extent of a number of Westernized Saudis. Many modern Saudis retain much of the inner belief if not the outer form of Islam. To them it is possible and highly desirable to build a modern Islamic society, retaining the ideological core of its original lifestyle, as an alternative to an imitation Western model.

As secular education increases and economic participation follows, the society is becoming more secularized, impinging on the authority of the ultra-conservative ulema, ignoring

some of the traditional customs and restrictions. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the values of Saudi society cannot be reconciled with social development.

Faith and change are not mutually antagonistic. To date, the alliance of secular education and religion, strange in Western thought, has proven quite feasible in Saudi Arabia. For example, at the College of Petroleum and Minerals, the most advanced institute of technology in the Kingdom, students take serious the words of the Prophet, "God loves those who do their work properly." The administration feels that "deepening and broadening the faith of its Muslim students, instilling in them an appreciation for the major contributions of their people to the world of mathematics and science" is as important as training those same students in engineering and science. (John Monro, "On Campus in Saudi Arabia," ARAMCO World Magazine, July-August 1974, p. 8)

It is the outward manifestation of the puritanical Wahhabi order of Islam that is under increased criticism. The religious police, drafted from the least desirable elements of society, are particularly resented today. The traditional religious taboos on smoking and drinking, religious censorship of the information media, and virtual prohibition of public entertainment cannot be enforced much longer. Today, the modernized Saudi lives two lives: one within the sight of the religious authority, one behind closed doors. The fact that this has become possible makes the situation more

tolerable. The Shi'a Muslims, a heterodox minority and long the brunt of unfair treatment from the religious police, are experiencing increasing religious tolerance. The secular authority, in that case, realizes that religious injustices carried out in the name of the government create new generations of young Shi'a willing to oppose the central authority. The examples of waning religious power are many. While the ulema today remain strong enough to slow the pace of social reform, they cannot prevent it. Their power is likely to erode throughout this decade.

Increased education is also causing the typical Saudi to contest those traditional practices which infringe on his individual freedom and social betterment. While he is not likely to reject his own cultural values and unquestioningly adopt Western norms in the process of modernization, he does seek to incorporate those methods and practices from the West that are complementary to his modernizing nation.

One area of change from traditional practices, directly traceable to educational development, is the status of women. One can see today (still an exception) women shopping alone or in groups. Most younger educated men are accompanied by their wives to social functions. Foreign women, permitted in the work force, are now recognized by their full first name, not a gender-concealing initial. This is hardly a prediction of a women's liberation movement, co-education, women working in close proximity to men or in positions felt to be unsuitable for their natures. One can see, however, that the rigid narrow

role of women is expanding, allowing them a much fuller, productive, and satisfying participation in modern Saudi Arabia.

In sum, the educated Saudi is not against the principles of the present order. However, while he does not contest the established political, religious, and traditional values, he is increasingly critical of many of the didactic and authoritarian practices: the slow political machinery of the regime, the confining effect of Wahhabi Islam, and some of the social traditions which are no longer applicable to the emerging Saudi society. If these desires for change invoke a government response of slow modernization and adaptation to present conditions, the educated Saudi is no threat. If ignored, they may result in resentment of the Saudi regime.

V. EDUCATION AND THE MANPOWER SHORTAGE

In 1970, the public school system had elementary school facilities for sixty percent of the male and thirty percent of the female six-year-old population. Seventeen percent of the male students and nine percent of the females continued to pursue their studies at the intermediate level. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The 1970-75 five year plan of the Central Planning Organization called for 90 percent male elementary enrollment and a doubling in the facilities of girls' elementary education.

In addition, it was hoped that 85 percent of the male and 17 percent of the female elementary graduates would continue in intermediate schools.

Although no statistics are currently available, it can be assumed that the government was not able to meet fully these objectives. They essentially projected a 50 percent increase in the number of elementary male students, a 100 percent increase in the number of elementary female students, a seven times increase in male intermediate enrollment, and a quadrupling of female intermediate enrollment. This requires a proportionate increase in facilities, materials, teachers, and administrative personnel. Even if classroom space and materials could be purchased, the additional number of trained Saudi administrative and teaching personnel could not be.* The estimated literacy rate remains between 15 and 25 percent.

As the population characteristics in Saudi Arabia are typical of that of most Middle Eastern countries, the majority of citizens young and with a life expectancy below that of the West. The children

* For example, by 1970 enough Saudi teachers had been trained to supply 150 percent of the demand for elementary teachers. Many of these individuals, however, preferred more prestigious, better paying positions in the public or private sector. Consequently, 43 percent of all elementary teachers that year had to be recruited abroad. The shortage of intermediate teachers is even more critical. Intermediate teachers, now trained at the college level, are certain to find more lucrative employment elsewhere. While the demand for native instructors is radically increasing, the supply is most likely diminishing.

of the 1970's are the labor force of the 1980's. Between 1975 and 1985, the educational level of entrants into the labor force will gradually rise, as the following projection shows:

Educational Level

	<u>Less than Elementary</u>	<u>Elementary</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
1976	45,419	10,380	2,817	3,531
1977	46,665	10,419	3,371	4,366
1978	46,394	10,859	3,777	4,652
1979	43,378	12,173	4,719	4,912
1980	40,413	13,844	7,459	5,470
1981	38,499	13,892	7,496	5,497
1982	36,842	13,989	8,758	4,486
1983	35,156	15,133	9,592	5,051
1984	35,782	16,109	11,589	5,932
1985	36,242	17,504	12,278	6,755
TOTAL	404,790	134,302	71,856	50,652

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Even the graduates, however, are products of the literacy-oriented, mediocre educational system and enter the work force with few if any applicable skills.

This sort of education has not succeeded in modifying the traditional Saudi's attitudes toward employment in skilled, semi-skilled, and labor positions. He remains a man "who enjoys his leisure, often works only to satisfy modest needs, and is not as highly motivated by material considerations as are other nationalities." (Labor Law and Practice in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 31) The value of

educational and technical skills are a relatively new concept to him. His focus in seeking education is not to prepare himself for gainful employment, but rather to qualify himself for a prestigious, respected position in the social order. For example, at the Eastern Province Vocational Training Center at Dammam, the Saudi director and his International Labor Organization colleague are convinced that the mentality of the students and their strong traditional views of "honorable occupation" dominated all the problems associated with training in vocational skills. Thus, electrical wiring and automotive maintenance, portrayed as scientific fields, remain far more popular with students than others, such as painting and blacksmithing.

This attitude is not limited to those with little or no education. The Saudi with a college degree in geology prefers administrative to field work, just as the graduate of an agricultural college will elect to man a government ministry position if offered. Many students pursuing higher education will do so only until they have saved enough of their student stipend to buy a taxi and go into business, two or three days a week, for themselves.

The Saudi worker, if not provided with close and firm, yet sympathetic supervision, feels no necessity to accomplish work at any given time. In most industries, labor productivity is held back by the slowness of Saudi workers and their generally passive attitude toward work. It was estimated in 1967 that most establishments

worked at less than fifty percent capacity and suffered high rates of shut down, operating costs, and management turnover. (Faisal Bashir, "Survey of the Private Industrial Sector in Saudi Arabia", Central Planning Organization, Riyadh, June 11, 1968)

In addition, the government continues to be by far the largest employer in the Kingdom, filling its own ranks with those of minimal education and offering "honorable" positions to drop-outs. (Ramon Knauerhase, "Saudi Arabia's Economy in the Beginning of the 1970's", Middle East Journal, Spring 1974, Vol. 20, No. 2) The government is also the dominant employer of more highly educated Saudis. This practice of overhiring at all levels can be seen as a government measure to distribute wealth through salaries. In doing so, however, potential laborers and trained talent are prevented from contributing to the growth of the private sector and participating in the nation's economic diversification.

Yet, it is this very economic expansion and diversification that is so strongly encouraged and supported by the government. With the unanticipated growth in oil revenues in the 1970's, Saudi Arabia has obtained the financial resources to undertake large projects for industrial, military and infrastructure development at an accelerated rate. If the major projects now planned go into effect as scheduled, the Kingdom's manpower requirements, already far in excess of local supply, will increase over the next five years. The Central Planning

Organization has estimated that the manpower needs of 1975-80 will exceed those of 1970-75 by 43 percent, as indicated below:

<u>Occupational Group</u>	<u>Increase in Manpower Needs 1970-75</u>	<u>Increase in Manpower Needs 1975-80</u>
Manual and Service Workers	137,710	197,714
Clerical and Sales Workers	67,500	96,887
Skilled and Semi-skilled Workers	55,630	79,874
Technicians and sub- professional Workers	4,580	6,555
Managers and Administrators	3,935	5,658
Professional Workers	2,445	3,512
Total Additional Manpower	271,800	390,200

In every occupational group, the needs are expected to exceed available Saudis. [REDACTED]

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Lacking adequate domestic supply, the nation has come to heavily and increasingly rely on foreign labor. In 1968, the Committee for Manpower Development and Utilization estimated that 45 percent of all employees in the six major cities of Riyadh, Jidda, Dammam, al-Kobar, Mecca, and Medina were non-Saudis. (p. 34, Labor Law and Practice in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) They occupy all types of positions, from those that the Saudi considers degrading to those for which he has not acquired the necessary skills and training. In a more recent survey, the Ministry of Labor found that over 60 percent of the private work force, excluding the petroleum industry, were non-Saudis. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The government itself, while terribly

overstaffed by its own hiring policy, fills between 35 and 70 percent of its positions with foreigners -- again, in those jobs that the Saudi cannot or will not do -- technicians, teachers, doctors, nurses, clerical workers, unskilled workers, and domestics.

The dependence on foreigners is least critical in the Eastern province, due to the long presence of ARAMCO and its continued efforts to recruit and train Saudis.* The percentage change in the nationality of the ARAMCO work force illustrates the successfulness of their program.

Nationality of ARAMCO Employees in Saudi Arabia*

	<u>1952</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1970</u>
Saudi	14,819 (61.7%)	9,813 (81.3%)	8,707 (83.3%)
Americans	3,235 (13.5%)	1,284 (10.6%)	904 (8.6%)
Arabs (non-Saudi)	2,254 (9.4%)	328 (2.7%)	258 (2.4%)
Indians	1,110 (4.6%)	408 (3.4%)	295 (2.8%)
Pakistani	1,320 (5.5%)	227 (1.9%)	211 (2.0%)
Others	<u>1,268 (5.3%)</u>	<u>13 (.1%)</u>	<u>80 (.76%)</u>
TOTAL	24,006	12,073	10,455

No industrial classification employed fewer than fifty percent nationals, with the exception of the technician supervisory group (12 to 10 in favor of non-Saudis). However, the following, less positive characteristics of the work force, nationwide, underline the critical need for expatriates:

1. The services expatriates provide are far more important than their number suggests. In cases of maintenance, repair, and emergency, they are essential.

2. The Saudi is far better at managing people, particularly other Saudis, than in managing ideas or machines. It is more in keeping with his nature to derive prestige and satisfaction from a supervisory position than from the work of a technical specialist. Again, the services of expatriates are essential.

3. The rate of job mobility is high among Saudis, whose skills are in demand. There is also a significant turn-over in lower occupational levels and in industry, where the impersonal, regulated routine is difficult to accept. (Labor Law and Practice in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, chapter IV. "Manpower Resources".)

In spite of the great need and use of foreign skills, unemployment among native Saudis is surprisingly low, estimated at 5.0 to 6.8 percent. This figure, however

does not take into account the high rate of disguised unemployment encouraged by government labor regulations and hiring practices in the public sector. Article 45 of the Labor Regulations of 1969 stipulates that the work force of every firm with over 100 employees must be 75 percent Saudi. This 75 percent must receive at least 51 percent of the payroll. In special cases, the Ministry of Labor will temporarily exempt a company from this quota system. The more common practice, however, is the hiring of the prescribed percentage of minimally trained Saudis and paying them for "near-zero" productivity.

Faced with the critical shortage of indigenous labor, one source of workers remains ignored: women. Although the Labor Regulations of 1969 make provisions for female workers, insuring them equal pay for equal work, little work is available. The private as well as the public sector opposes using women in positions traditionally filled by men. Consequently, the number of women in the work force remains infinitesimal. The Labor Regulations are currently applied to the non-Saudi women, usually the wives of foreign workers, who perform clerical duties for foreign companies. And even then "in no case may (men and women) co-mingle in the place of work or in the accessory facilities or other appurtenances thereto." (Article 160, Labor Regulations, 1969)

VI. OPTIONS IN MEETING THE MANPOWER SHORTAGE

Obviously, the educational system's record of achievement has been below expectation. While the level of education of the potential labor force is improving, the context of education has changed little and supplies too few practical skills. If a policy of economic diversification is to be followed, Saudi Arabia will be faced with an increasingly acute manpower shortage. How the nation responds to this problem will determine the nature and magnitude of the effects.

The government today is aware of the importance of the issue. It realizes that this shortage is the major deterrent to internal investment, industrial development, and economic diversification. It accepts the fact that the problem has no immediate solution, since domestic measures can have only a limited positive effect. It has already made some observations and decisions.

First, "a concerted and massive effort dedicated to the training and development of the Saudi labor force must be initiated and sustained." (Guidelines for the Second Development Plan 1975-80, Saudi Arabian Central Planning Organization, p. 184) The national training objective must be incorporated with the educational effort. The educational system can become a tool to provide laborers through intensified programs of adult, rural, military, and vocational training.

Second, available labor must be more efficiently allocated. Studies and projections, such as the Central Planning Organization's Development Plan, have been made. Regional employment offices are located throughout the Kingdom. If, in conjunction with these efforts, interministerial bickering could be reduced and poor communications among government agencies could be improved, more at least minimally skilled and educated Saudis would be available to the private sector.

Third, contracts signed by the Saudi government and development firms and new industries to be located within the country are to include requirements that training programs be provided to integrate Saudis into skilled and administrative positions. The hope is that native expertise and employment will develop as it has in the Eastern Province through ARAMCO. In addition, the Ministry of Labor is expected to expand its vocational training system and establish a national pre-training program for early school-leavers. The use of training facilities abroad is also being considered.

The Central Planning Organization also anticipates a slow growth in the number of women working outside the home, increasing from 1 percent of the female population in 1970 to 5 percent in 1990. While there is no cultural sanction against women working, as can be seen in rural areas throughout the Middle East where women perform many non-household tasks, the life-style which developed with urbanization has largely limited the female role. One can judge from the experience in most Arab countries that the move toward widescale female employment will evolve slowly, and, in Saudi

Arabia, with cautious supervision. This development will cause no great social upheaval; rather, female employment -- already beginning -- will be the natural sequel to female education. The Labor Regulations of 1969 anticipated the trend. In January 1972, the government accepted applications of female intermediate and secondary school graduates for jobs in several ministries; the first Saudi girl will be admitted to the School of Medicine of Riyadh University this fall; a growing number of Saudi girls are working behind closed doors in offices of private Saudi firms; and an ARAMCO request to begin training Saudi girls in secretarial and clerical skills was recently approved.

The above developments, supplemented with programs to improve the Saudi's attitude toward vocational training and remove his prejudice toward many occupations, will provide an increasingly larger indigenous labor force. The process is a slow one, however, and the positive results, even in the most optimistic of estimates, are dwarfed by the magnitude of demand for labor.

This huge demand will force employment of foreign workers at increasing rates. The following figures, although low in regard to non-Saudi workers, do depict the trend if not the full extent of future dependence on foreign nationals.

Central Planning Organization Projections (in millions)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Saudi</u>	<u>Non-Saudi</u>	<u>Total</u>
1980	1.47 (1.41)	.48	1.95
1985	1.72 (1.64)	.65	2.37
1990	2.01 (1.90)	.87	2.88

(Figures in parentheses are males)
Extracted from Saudi Central Planning Organization document, "Guidelines for the Five-Year Plan (1975-80)".

Using this projection, the non-Saudi participation in the labor force is expected to increase from 17.1 percent in 1970 to 24.6 percent in 1980 to 30.2 percent in 1990. The foreign community, however, is likely to change in more than just size.

The non-Saudi work force of 1970 was composed largely of Hadhramis from the Hadhramaut area of Yemen (Aden) and Yemenis (Sana).^{*} The Hadhramis have been in Saudi Arabia for a long time, and many have assimilated. They are traditionally in trade at all levels of income. The Yemenis (Sana) are for the most part unskilled and perform much of the manual labor in the Kingdom. Most of these workers send high remittances home, often as much as one-half of their pay. As fellow Arabs and Moslems, essentially migratory and apolitical, these workers have had no marked political or social influence on the Kingdom.

Implementation of Saudi Arabia's ambitious economic and social development plans requires modern skills and technical expertise which cannot be supplied through Saudi, Arab, or even entirely Moslem labor resources. Consequently, a growing proportion of the

^{*} In addition to the estimated 120,000 to 150,000 Hadhramis and 100,000 Yemenis, the 1970 work force included: approximately 50,000 Jordanians employed in commercial and managerial posts, 40,000 Syrians serving as government advisors and providing managerial and professional skills, 30,000 Lebanese, a few thousand Egyptians, about 5,000 Pakistanis and Indians, 14,000 Sudanese, a few thousand Ethiopians and Somalis, and 12,000 Europeans and Americans. (Labor Law and Practice in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia p. 33)

foreign community will be Western oriented, holding political and religious beliefs, practicing life styles that are quite alien to traditional Saudi society. In importing necessary skills, the government will be introducing a community whose cultural difference will prevent assimilation and whose number will prevent them from being hidden or ignored. The government will no longer be able to control the pace and direction of social change by rigidly restricting those influences to which the Saudi people are exposed.

There exists today in Saudi Arabia an increasing awareness that the degree of social, political and attitudinal change which would accompany wholesale modernization could threaten the vision of a modern Islamic state. Rather than moving toward the ultimate goal of economic diversification and full Saudi participation in the economic life of the country, "the Kingdom may well find that Saudis are becoming second-class citizens in their own land -- engaged in dead-end jobs and earning below-average incomes -- because of the failure to provide the means to develop their potential and capabilities." (Guidelines for the Second Development Plan 1975-1980, Saudi Arabian Central Planning Organization, p. 184)

The government must choose between following a path of economic diversification or postponing those plans until the Saudi people are more prepared to participate in the economic structure and responsibly control the form of social change. The first holds the threat of

unknown social developments; the second, the threat of a day when the one-resource economy will no longer support the state.